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When the WTO Works, and How It Fails
Anu Bradford1

This Article seeks to explain when an international legal framework like the WTO
can facilitate international cooperation and when it fails to do so. Using an empirical
inquiry into different agreements that the WTO has attempted to facilitate—specifically
intellectual property and antitrust regulation—it reveals more general principles about
when and why the WTO can facilitate agreement in some situations and not others.
Comparing the successful conclusion of the TRIPs Agreement and the failed attempts to
negotiate a WTO antitrust agreement reveal that international cooperation is likely to
emerge when the interests of powerful states are closely aligned and when concentrated
interest groups within those states actively support cooperation. They further suggest that
the WTO provides an optimal forum for cooperation when states need to rely on crossissue linkages to overcome existing distributional conflicts, when the underlying issue
calls for an enforcement mechanism, or when both the net benefits of the agreement and
the opportunity costs of non-agreement are high. Contrasting the key differences between
IP and antitrust cooperation, this Article disputes the widely held view that the strategic
situation underlying IP and antitrust cooperation are similar and that the conclusion of
the TRIPs Agreement is a relevant precedent predicting a successful WTO negotiation on
antitrust or a host of other new regulatory issues Given the ongoing changes in the
economic and political landscape, cooperation in the WTO is even more challenging
today and it is possible that—absent institutional reforms—the WTO’s recent expansion
may well have met its limits.
INTRODUCTION
International efforts to seek regulatory convergence produce strikingly different
results even in situations where economic implications of the regulatory regimes appear
similar. For instance, the enforcement of antitrust laws and the protection of intellectual
property rights (“IPRs”) across the jurisdictions have enormous implications for major
economic powers and domestic constituencies within those powers, creating pressures for
international cooperation. Yet the efforts to harmonize the two regulatory regimes have
followed very different paths. The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (“TRIPs”) was a contentious matter with enormous distributional
1
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consequences. Nevertheless, states agreed to incorporate IPRs into the WTO in 1995. In
contrast, various attempts to launch WTO negotiations on antitrust have all failed.2
Instead, states have sought to minimize negative externalities of decentralized antitrust
enforcement by engaging in case-by-case enforcement cooperation and by developing
recommendations and best practices to foster voluntary convergence of their respective
antitrust regimes.3
The successful incorporation of IPRs into the WTO cultivated a sense of false
optimism on the inherently flexible boundaries of the WTO, fostering a belief that the
trade regime is capable of accommodating a host of new issues, including antitrust,
investment, corruption, labor, and environment, among others.4 Scholars have thus far
concentrated on assessing the normative desirability of expanding the WTO’s mandate to
these new issue areas. The most cohesive attempt to do this took place when the
American Journal of International Law published a symposium issue on the boundaries of
the WTO.5 In the symposium, several prominent trade scholars sought to develop criteria
that can be used to assess whether any given issue belongs to the trade institution or
whether it should be regulated elsewhere.
This Article examines the institutional boundaries of the WTO from a descriptive
perspective. It seeks to identify conditions that explain and predict when an international
legal framework like the WTO can advance international cooperation and when it fails to
do so. It departs from the existing scholarly debate on the substantive scope of the WTO,
which focuses on the question of the normative desirability of expanding the boundaries
of the WTO and the development of criteria in selecting issues that should be brought
into the WTO. Instead, it focuses on the feasibility of the WTO agreement, seeking to
understand when the WTO works and when it does not, given the characteristics of the
underlying issue of cooperation, constraints that stem from power politics and domestic
political economy, and the comparative institutional advantages of the WTO. Thus, the
goal is to define the institutional scope of the WTO by isolating the predominant
variables that determine when an agreement within this regime is likely to materialize
and when states are likely to turn to alternative regulatory regimes instead.
The Article begins with a standard assumption that international cooperation is
more likely to emerge when the interests of powerful states are closely aligned and when
concentrated and influential interest groups within those states support the agreement.
2

See, e.g., PHILIP MARSDEN, COMPETITION POLICY FOR THE WTO, ch. 1 (Cameron May 2003). Most
recently, the WTO negotiations on antitrust were stalled in Cancun in 2003 due to the resistance of the
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policy from the Doha Round negotiation agenda (“July decision”). See Decision Adopted by the General
Council on 1 August 2004, WT/L/579 (Aug. 2, 2004).
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See, e.g., Oliver Budzinski, The International Competition Network: Prospects and Limits on the Road
towards International Competition Governance, 8 COMP. & CHANGE 223, 223-42 (2004); Anu Piilola,
Assessing Theories of Global Governance: A Case Study of International Antitrust Regulation, 39 STAN. J.
INT’L L. 207, 235–36 (2003); Frederic Jenny, International cooperation on competition: myth, reality and
perspective, 48 ANTITRUST BULL. 973, 973-1003 (2003).
4
See Steve Charnovitz, Triangulating the World Trade organization, 96(1) AM. J. INT’L L. 28, 29 (2002).
5
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These factors are often used to explain why international cooperation in a given instance
has been successful. Without their presence, the prospects for a WTO agreement (or any
other international treaty) are dim. However, these factors fail to explain when powerful
states choose to cooperate in the WTO as opposed to another international legal
framework.
This Article asserts that the WTO offers the optimal legal framework for
cooperation in the presence of three conditions. First, the WTO is a particularly useful
vehicle for cooperation when states need to, and are able to, rely on “issue-linkages” to
overcome existing distributional conflicts. Second, the WTO is also a preferred forum
when the underlying issue is prone to defection and when sustainable cooperation
therefore calls for an enforcement mechanism. Finally, states are more likely to pursue
cooperation in the WTO in the presence of high net benefits from cooperation that exceed
the high costs of formal, institutionalized cooperation.
The Article then moves on to examine these predictors of successful cooperation
in the context of two in-depth case studies—the successful conclusion of the TRIPs
Agreement and the failed attempts to negotiate a WTO antitrust agreement. There are five
fundamental differences between the strategic situations characterizing these two areas of
cooperation. First, the great economic powers all supported the TRIPs Agreement but
disagreed on the need to negotiate a WTO antitrust agreement. Second, influential
interest groups within the great powers unequivocally endorsed the TRIPs Agreement,
while there has been little, if any, interest-group support for the international antitrust
agreement. Third, transfer payments in the form of issue-linkages were successfully
employed to address the unequal distributional consequences of the TRIPs Agreement. In
contrast, ex ante uncertainty regarding the winners and losers under the prospective
antitrust agreement obstructed states’ ability to devise these types of issue linkages and,
as a result, compromised their ability to solve the distributional conflict. Fourth, defection
from a prospective agreement was a concern underlying the TRIPs negotiations,
rendering the WTO and its Dispute Settlement Mechanism (“DSM”) particularly
attractive for the TRIPs Agreement. In contrast, the likelihood of defection and hence the
need for an enforcement mechanism was a lesser concern in antitrust negotiations,
diminishing the need to pursue cooperation within the WTO. Finally, the benefits of
cooperating and the opportunity costs of not cooperating in the WTO were significantly
higher with respect to IPRs than they were in the case of antitrust, reinforcing the case for
the TRIPs Agreement and making the case for a WTO antitrust agreement less
compelling.
By unveiling the key differences between these two areas of cooperation, this
Article challenges the widely held view that the strategic situation underlying IPR and
antitrust cooperation would be very similar and that the TRIPs Agreement would
therefore offer an instructive precedent for successful WTO antitrust negotiations.6 A
closer examination of the two areas of cooperation reveals that the TRIPs negotiations
6

Andrew Guzman has developed a most detailed argument on why the TRIPs negotiations should be
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and the antitrust negotiations have, in fact, very little in common. Given that the
dynamics underlying antitrust cooperation would—at least intuitively—appear to be most
similar to those underlying cooperation on IPRs, the two case studies also cast doubt on
the ability of the TRIPs Agreement to provide a template in other proposed areas of
cooperation such as environment or labor, where the political economy conditions seem
further removed from those underlying the TRIPs negotiations.
The two case studies also challenge certain standard assumptions on international
cooperation. The WTO rules are based on consensus, suggesting that any given
agreement that is reached ought to be Pareto-improving for all the members of the
organization. If an agreement were to make any state worse off, that state would use its
veto rights to block the agreement.7 This is consistent with any rational choice model that
assumes that states pursue international cooperation only when benefits from such
cooperation exceed the costs involved. However, the examination of the TRIPs and
antitrust negotiations reveal that certain zero-sum agreements that leave some states
worse off (such as TRIPs) do materialize within the WTO whereas win-win agreements
that are widely considered to be Pareto-improving for all states (such as antitrust) can be
unsuccessful.8 One of the goals of this Article is to explain why this happens. Similarly,
conventional wisdom suggests that cooperation is less likely in the presence of stark
distributional conflicts or incentives to defect. However, this Article argues that it is
exactly in the presence of these two conditions when a WTO agreement is most likely to
emerge. Consequently, a more nuanced theory on cooperation within the WTO is needed.
The Article proceeds as follows. Section I discusses the institutional capacity of
the WTO, laying out key predictors of when the WTO can advance international
cooperation and when it fails to do so. Section II examines these predictors through a
case study focusing on two prominent WTO negotiations—the successful TRIPs
negotiations and the failed antitrust negotiations—and identifies the key differences
between the two areas of cooperation. These differences, the Article argues, capture the
very conditions that allow us to predict whether cooperation in the WTO is feasible. The
conclusion discusses the prospects of future cooperation in the WTO, applying the
lessons from the case studies to the changing political and economic landscape in which
the WTO negotiations are likely to take place in the future.
I. A Theory of Cooperation in the WTO
The WTO is often hailed as the most effective international institution. With a
broad membership and an extensive set of internationally binding obligations, the WTO
has ensured that states open their borders by lowering tariffs and removing various nontariff barriers that restrict international trade. More open trade has secured worldwide
7

Richard H. Steinberg, In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining and Outcomes in
the GATT/WTO, 56 INT’L ORG. 339, 345 (2002). Similarly, a state might block agreements that resulted in
positive-sum outcomes if such an agreement inequitably distributed the benefits among the trading
partners.
8
See Susan K. Sell, Intellectual Property Protection and Antitrust in the Developing World: Crisis,
Coercion, and Choice, 49 INT’L ORG. 315, 315-50 (1995) (surmising that TRIPs should have been harder to
agree as all states had something to gain from at least some minimum set of antitrust laws).
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economic growth and increased prosperity across the global markets. While trade
liberalization has its critics, few would suggest that the WTO has not accomplished its
primary mission of reducing obstacles to international trade. Much of the WTO’s success
is attributed to its ability to enforce commitments through its dispute settlement
mechanism. This sets the WTO apart from most other international institutions that lack
means to hold states accountable for the breach of their obligations. Unlike much of
international law, the WTO obligations constitute “hard law” that is backed by sanctions.
This feature has also cultivated a perception of distinct effectiveness of WTO
agreements, resulting in pressures to incorporate a number of new issues into the WTO.
The attempts to link various “nontrade” issues into the WTO have become a
subject of extensive debate and controversy.9 There is no shortage of advocates—whether
diplomats or governments, scholars, private interests or non-governmental
organizations—arguing for or against the expansion of the traditional trade agenda to new
areas of cooperation. These disagreements have derailed Ministerial meetings and
collapsed negotiations, undermining the credibility of the WTO and at times calling into
question the entire mission of the trade regime.10 Unfortunately, the extensive debates
have all failed to provide explicit criteria or a coherent analytical framework for assessing
the optimal scope of the WTO.
Any normative discussion on the boundaries of the WTO needs a more solid
positive foundation that includes a more nuanced understanding of the institutional
capacity of the WTO. International relations literature has generated ambivalent and often
contradictory insights on situations where international institutions can facilitate
cooperation, offering only limited guidance on the circumstances in which agreements
are likely to emerge in the WTO.11 The discussion below seeks to fill that gap by
disaggregating the most essential conditions that determine whether WTO agreements are
likely to succeed or fail. Section A discusses when international cooperation in general is
feasible. Section B focuses on when such cooperation is likely to take place in the WTO.
A. When Is International Cooperation Feasible?
Two preconditions must be present for any international cooperation to emerge
irrespective of the institutional form such cooperation ultimately takes. First, powerful
states must agree on the need and form of cooperation. Second, powerful interest groups
9

See references to this in John H. Jackson, Afterword: the Linkage Problem—Comments on Five Texts, 96
AM. J. INT’L L. 118, ### (2002).
10
Id.
11
The three primary views on the role of institutions offer very different predictions on the WTO’s ability
to foster agreements among states. The most pessimistic views of international cooperation claim that
institutions are irrelevant and unable to constrain states. More optimistic advocates of institutions claim that
institutions exert independent influence on states, constraining states’ self-interested behavior and
subverting international anarchy that would otherwise prevail. The third view takes the middle road,
claiming that institutions are constrained by the underlying structure of state interests but that they can still
mitigate market failures that stem from the anarchic system of international relations. See Daniel Y. Kono,
Making Anarchy Work: International Legal Institutions and Trade Cooperation, 69 J. POL. 746, 746
(2007).
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within those states must support cooperation on the issue area. While these conditions
apply across the international institutional landscape, they also form a starting point for
assessing the feasibility of a WTO agreement.
Even though WTO rule-making is based on de facto consensus among all states,
in practice the legislative outcomes often reflect the underlying power structures of the
member states.12 In the WTO context, power refers to the relative market size of each
state. A state with a large domestic market can offer more attractive access to its trading
partner and thus extract more in return for agreeing to open its domestic market.13 Large
economies generally benefit from greater internal trade opportunities. Small states are
therefore more dependent on trade opportunities negotiated in the WTO and less able to
exert pressure by threatening to close their markets. For instance, the prospect of being
shut out of the Guatemalan market is far less damaging to the United States than the
converse prospect of Guatemala losing the opportunity to export to the United States.
This variance in the opportunity costs of market closure shifts the balance of power
further toward the large economies.14
The United States and the European Union (“EU”) are the unequivocal powers in
the WTO system, based on the size of their domestic markets.15 While their relative
economic dominance is gradually diminishing as emerging economies such as China and
India continue to grow, the United States and the EU combined still account for one-third
of all world imports in both manufactured goods and commercial services. In addition,
the combined GDP of the United States and the EU still constitutes forty percent of the
world’s total GDP.16
Great powers can take advantage of less powerful states’ dependence on them in
several ways. In one extreme, great powers can resort to coercive tactics. In the trade
domain, coercion has typically consisted of economic sanctions (or threats thereof) or
withdrawal of economic benefits (such as removal of country’s Generalized System of
Preferences (“GSP”) status that allows it to benefit from more favorable tariff schemes).
Great powers can also use selective incentives and conditional benefits to persuade less
powerful countries to adopt their preferred trade policies. They can negotiate conditional
trade agreements or use their economic leverage through international institutions such as
World Bank or IMF. Economic assistance that great powers extend to developing
12

See Steinberg, supra note 7.
Steinberg, supra note 7. Any given liberalization measure thus gives greater benefits to a smaller state,
since it gains proportionately more foreign market access and thereby more welfare and net employment
gains.
14
Id.
15
Steinberg, supra note 7, at 348.
16
See WSDBHome, http://stat.wto.org/Home/WSDBHome.aspx (last visited Mar. 2, 2010). The United
States’ share of total world imports was fifteen percent (merchandised goods) and twelve percent
(commercial services). The EU’s shares were eighteen percent and twenty-three percent, respectively. The
United States 2006 GDP was $13.2 trillion and EU’s 2006 GDP $12.6 trillion. The total world 2006 GDP
was approximately $65 trillion. Compare that in 1994, when the Uruguay Round, including the TRIPs
negotiations, was closed, the combined merchandise imports to the United States and the EU constituted
forty percent of the world total merchandised imports and their combined GDP represented nearly fifty
percent of the total world GDP. See id.
13

7

countries is often conditional on the recipient country adopting progressive economic
policies and carrying out certain institutional reforms. These tactics steer less powerful
economies toward regulatory regimes preferred by great powers.
Even if the great powers agreed on the need to cooperate, they are likely to devote
their limited resources to pursuing cooperation on issues that offer political gains for
them.17 The prospect of producing concrete benefits to discrete and influential domestic
interest groups maximizes their political rents from cooperation. Interest groups are likely
to support an international agreement when expected benefits of the agreement are
concentrated and costs diffuse.18 Concentrated benefits stimulate organized activity as the
beneficiaries of the agreement seek to institutionalize their expected gains. At the same
time, when the costs of an agreement fall on a large number of stakeholders, their
individual stake in opposing the agreement is not high enough to motivate the formation
of an effective opposing coalition against the agreement. Thus, the agreement is more
likely to materialize in the presence of organized activity supporting the agreement and in
the absence of a tight counter-coalition challenging the agreement.19
B. When Does Cooperation Emerge in the WTO?
Even when the great powers and influential domestic interest groups within those
powers support international cooperation, it is not evident that states find it rational to
cooperate within the WTO. At times, states pursue cooperation in another multilateral,
multi-issue framework20 or within a single-issue organization.21 At other times states
regard bilateral cooperation as sufficient. The discussion below examines the conditions
under which the WTO can facilitate regulatory convergence and the conditions under
which other regimes are preferred. It argues that the WTO offers the most advantageous
institutional setting for cooperation in the presence of three key attributes: first, when
deep distributional conflict calls for strategic linkages across issue-areas to forge an
agreement; second, when high likelihood of defection calls for provisions for monitoring
and enforcement; and finally, when the availability of high net benefits exceed the high
costs of long and cumbersome WTO negotiations.
The WTO can facilitate the conclusion of international agreements by enabling
states to negotiate transfer payments across different issues. If an agreement on a single
issue area by itself is not feasible, states can broaden the scope for a compromise by
17

Governments negotiating international agreements are assumed to be motivated by both public welfare
and public choice considerations.
18
Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 42 INT’L ORG.
427, 445 (1988).
19
James Q. Wilson, The Politics of Regulation, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY: READINGS IN THE POLITICS
AND ECONOMICS OF AMERICAN PUBLIC POLICY 86–87 (Thomas Ferguson & Joel Rogers eds., M.E. Sharpe
1984).
20
Efforts to pursue international antitrust cooperation have also taken place, for instance, in the
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”) and the United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development (“UNCTAD”).
21
States also continue to cooperate on IPR issues in the World Intellectual Property Organization
(“WIPO”). In the absence of progress in the WTO, states have pursued international antitrust cooperation in
the International Competition Network (“ICN”).
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strategically linking a contested issue to other items on the trade agenda. “Issue linkage”
constitutes a side payment where winning states compensate losing states to convince
them to sign on to the agreement.22 Extending the negotiation agenda increases the
likelihood that all states can gain from an agreement that is part of the package. Thus,
issue linkages provide an opportunity to mitigate distributional conflicts, opening up new
possibilities for efficient agreements.23
Issue linkages are particularly helpful in overcoming domestic resistance to an
international agreement.24 Broadening the negotiation agenda counteracts protectionist
coalitions by mobilizing countervailing forces that support trade liberalization. When
issues are added to the negotiation, new coalitions emerge to counter the protectionist
sentiments, offering governments political rents that can exceed the costs that the
protectionist coalition incurs.25 Grouping multiple issues in a single negotiation also
constrains the ability of a single ministry to block negotiations. For instance, the Ministry
of Agriculture in France would at all times resist an international agreement that curtailed
France’s ability to subsidize its farmers. But when agriculture is incorporated in a multiissue WTO negotiation, the relative influence of the Ministry of Agriculture is diluted
due to the involvement of other domestic ministries with interests that counterbalance one
another.26 However, linkages are not always feasible, in particular in the presence of ex
ante uncertainty relating to distributional consequences of a prospective agreement. If
states do not know who would win and who would lose under the agreement, their
abilities to devise transfer payments are compromised. In addition, linkages can burden
the negotiation agenda, unraveling compromises on issues which could successfully be
negotiated in isolation.27
While linkages within the WTO facilitate agreements that would not be feasible in
the absence of the linkages, states always retain an incentive to defect on the package
deals they have negotiated.28 The WTO can help states solidify issue linkages and reduce
their incentives for defection. The WTO agreements are legally binding on all member
states. If a WTO member violates its obligations, the WTO can authorize trade retaliation
22

R.D. Tollison & T.D. Willett, An economic theory of mutually advantageous issue linkages in
international organization, 33 INT’L ORG. 425, 430-37 (1979).
23
See id. See also James K. Sebenius, Negotiation Arithmetic: Adding and Subtracting Issues and Parties,
37 INT’L ORG. 281, 300 (1983). Linkage represents an effective way of overcoming a distributional conflict
when direct transfer payments are not feasible.
24
Christina Davis, International Institutions and Issue Linkage: Building Support for Agricultural Trade
Liberalization, 98 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 153, 164 (2004). Contrary to several studies contending that
economic interests, market power or lobbying activities explain when trade liberalization occurs, Davis
shows that institutional cross-issue linkages are more relevant in determining trade patterns. Issue linkage
has forged an agreement when powerful lobby groups have opposed cooperation. Linkage alters the interest
group dynamics by mobilizing coalitions to counter parochial pressures. Thus, “liberalization will be most
likely when the linkage successfully counters the collective action problems and institutional biases at the
domestic level that favor protection.”
25
Id. at 158.
26
Id. at 153.
27
Sebenius, supra note 23, at 300.
28
As long as states are able to enhance their individual payoff by defecting from the linkage equilibrium,
the temptation to defect from agreed transfer payments exists.
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measures and hold states accountable through the DSM.29 The enforceability of WTO
agreements challenges the common view that international law is always “soft” and
compliance with it, voluntary. Thus, the WTO serves two related purposes: it facilitates
the formation of linkages at the treaty-making stage and helps to sustain these linkages by
raising the costs of defection at the compliance stage.
The need for enforcement is more germane in some areas of international
cooperation than in others. When states choose between binding, enforceable agreements
and non-binding agreements with no enforcement provisions, the key causal variable is
the risk of opportunism.30 Binding international agreements with cautiously negotiated
commitments are less susceptible to self-serving interpretation by states.31 Such
agreements also deter cheating by raising the cost of non-compliance.32 Thus, binding
agreements are particularly advantageous in Prisoners Dilemma (“PD”) situations where
the potential for costly opportunism is high and cheating is difficult to detect.33 In
contrast, when the incentives to defect from the agreed commitments are low, a binding
agreement with enforceable commitments is less valuable. This is the case predominantly
in coordination games (“CG”) where the parties generally lack the incentives to deviate
from the agreement once the focal point of coordination has been established.34
Accordingly, if the cooperation problem that states face resembles a PD (which
acknowledges an intrinsic incentive for the players to cheat), states are more likely to
negotiate a binding agreement with enforcement provisions. In contrast, if the
cooperation problem resembles a CG (where agreements are largely self-enforcing),
enforcement provisions are redundant and thus often not included. Barbara Koremenos’s
recent empirical study on international agreements with dispute settlement provisions
supports this argument. Koremenos finds that approximately half of all international
agreements among states include dispute settlement provisions. She also found that states
include dispute settlement provisions only when they are likely to be needed. In other
words, the inclusion of the dispute settlement provision correlates positively with the
likelihood of non-compliance or “the strength of individual actors’ incentives to cheat.”35
It follows that the likelihood of states negotiating agreements within the WTO should
also positively correlate with the likelihood of the states’ incentives to behave
opportunistically.
29

Kenneth W. Abbott, Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International Lawyers, 14
YALE J. INT’L L. 335, 358-59 (1989).
30
Kal Raustiala, Form and Substance in International Agreements, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 581, 593-94 (2005).
31
Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 54 INT'L ORG.
421, 426–27 (2000) (hereinafter Abbott & Snidal, Hard and Soft Law).
32
The costs of reneging can manifest themselves both in the form of reputational costs or actual sanctions.
See id. at 427.
33
Id. at 429.
34
Raustiala, Form and Substance, supra note 30, at 592-94. See also Abbott, supra note 29, at 358-59, 36374. While the possibility of defection is not entirely absent in coordination situations, any surreptitious
cheating, at least, is unlikely. See Lisa L. Martin, The Rational State Choice of Multilateralism, in
MULTILATERALISM MATTERS: THE THEORY AND PRAXIS OF AN INSTITUTIONAL FORM 91, 102 (John Gerard
Ruggie ed., Columbia 1993).
35
Barbara Koremenos, If Only Half of International Agreements Have Dispute Resolution Provisions,
Which Half Needs Explaining?, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 189, 192, 209 (2007).
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Finally, states’ choice of venue for negotiating international agreements reflects
their perception of which institution allows them to obtain the best possible outcome at
the lowest cost.36 In addition to the WTO’s key advantages—linkages and enforcement
mechanism—states’ willingness to pursue an agreement in the WTO turns on the
availability of alternatives they have outside the WTO. The higher the opportunity costs
of non-agreement in the WTO are, the more persistent states’ efforts to include the issue
in the WTO will be. In contrast, the more content the states are with the status quo or the
more non-WTO alternatives they have, the lower the costs of forgoing the WTO
negotiations are. Thus, the likelihood of the WTO agreement is often not only a function
of costs and benefits of the WTO agreement, but also a function of the opportunity costs
of a non-WTO agreement.37
II. Testing the Limits of the WTO: Explaining the Divergent Outcomes in the
IPR and Antitrust Cooperation
States’ pursuit of international IPR and antitrust cooperation under the auspices of
the WTO forms part of a broader goal to institutionalize deregulation and trade
liberalization globally and to further expand the liberalization trend to the sphere of
domestic regulation. Following significant gains in reducing tariff barriers on goods and
services, the focus of trade talks has moved from the removal of conventional trade
barriers to identifying and addressing new trade barriers that states erect to protect their
domestic markets. For instance, states are projected to employ lax or strategic antitrust
laws or offer inadequate protection of IPRs to hinder the free flow of goods and services
into their markets.38 Fears of new forms of protectionism have reinforced demands to
expand the scope of the WTO to include rules on IPRs and antitrust, among other areas,
to preserve the economic benefits of free trade.39
IPRs were successfully brought under the auspices of the WTO in 1994 when the
TRIPs Agreement was adopted as a part of the Final Act of the Uruguay Round. The
Agreement established a global IPR regime with provisions to protect and enforce
36

Davis, supra note 24, at 4.
See, e.g., David Lax & James Sebenius, The Power of Alternatives or the Limits to Negotiation, in
NEGOTIATION THEORY AND PRACTICE 97-114 (J. William Breslin & Jeffery Z. Rubin eds., Program on
Negotiation at Harvard Law School 1991).
38
See Andrew T. Guzman, The Case for International Antitrust, in COMPETITION LAWS IN CONFLICT:
ANTITRUST JURISDICTION IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 99, 101, 108-09 (Richard A. Epstein & Michael S.
Greve eds., AEI Press 2004).
39
The growing trend to broaden the WTO’s negotiation agenda can also be explained by the WTO’s
successful historical track record in embracing a variety of more or less trade-related areas. The undeniable
substantive links that trade policy has with other policy domains has further contributed to the perception
that the WTO is a natural forum to pursue regulatory reforms in any area of economy. In addition, the
WTO has been a particularly attractive forum for pursuing further trade liberalization due to the broad
membership and the enforcement mechanism that the institution offers. Various interest groups demanding
greater global regulation therefore often consider WTO to be the most effective forum for them to advance
their goals. The WTO’s perceived effectiveness has further reinforced path dependency and regime
persistence. See, e.g., Robert O. Keohane, International institutions: Two approaches, 32 INT’L STUD. Q.
379, 389 (1988); Jose E. Alvarez, Symposium: The Boundaries of the WTO: The WTO as Linkage
Machine, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 146, 146-47 (2002).
37
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patents, copyrights, trademarks and trade secrets. The TRIPs Agreement provides for
minimum standards that all WTO members are bound by, coupled with a system to
enforce those standards internationally. The initiative for the Agreement came from a
small group of powerful U.S. corporations whose activities depend on strong IP
protection. They mobilized the support of their counterparts in the EU and Japan. The
United States, EU, and Japanese corporations subsequently lobbied their respective
governments and ensured that their IP agenda remained a negotiating priority for the key
states.
Initially, developed countries pushing for the agreement faced strong resistance
from developing countries including India, Brazil and Korea. After eight years of trade
talks, however, the TRIPs Agreement emerged as a part of a “grand bargain” consisting
of multiple trade deals all incorporated in the Final Act of the newly established WTO.
The TRIPs Agreement was the result of collaboration among some of the most powerful
multinational corporations (“MNCs”) and some of the most powerful states in the global
trading system. As the discussion below explains, the developing country resistance to
the Agreement was suppressed with a mix of persuasion, pressure, threats, linkages, and
other bargaining tactics.
For those who advocate expanding the scope of the WTO, TRIPs is used as an
important precedent showing that the WTO can accommodate new issues that fall outside
of the traditional non-discrimination regime and encroach into the realm of domestic
regulation. The TRIPs Agreement imposes positive obligations on states to undertake
regulatory reforms, going well beyond the scope of issues traditionally addressed in the
WTO. The TRIPs is also an oft-cited precedent for those who argue that the WTO is best
suited to address issues with distributional consequences that create winners and losers.
For instance, while developing countries would have been unlikely to sign onto a
standalone agreement on IPRs, they conceded in the WTO framework where TRIPs was
a part of broader package that ensured gains to each WTO member.
The success of the TRIPs Agreement has fostered a perception that antitrust
commitments ought to be feasible to negotiate in the WTO as well. Andrew Guzman, for
instance, claims that “a very similar strategic relationship among countries existed in IP
until an agreement was reached during the Uruguay Round GATT/WTO talks. The IP
case study offers a valuable lesson about how competition [antitrust] negotiations ought
to proceed”.40 However, as the recent history of WTO negotiations show, the efforts to
negotiate an antitrust agreement under the auspices of the WTO have failed and
cooperation has followed a very different path.
States have pursued antitrust cooperation since the adoption of Havana Charter in
1948.41 The EU, with the support of Canada and Japan, has been the primary proponent
of the WTO antitrust agreement. The United States has consistently resisted attempts to
40

Guzman, supra note 6, at 974.
See, e.g., Nataliya Yacheistova, The International Competition Regulation – A Short Review of a Long
Evolution, 18 WORLD COMPETITION, LAW AND ECON. 99, 99–110, (1994). See also MARSDEN, supra note 2,
at ch. 1.
41
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incorporate antitrust in the trade regime. In 1996, at the request of the EU, the WTO
Ministerial Conference established a Working Group on Competition. The task of the
Working Group was to examine the linkages between trade and antitrust issues and
identify issues that the WTO should potentially address in this regard. In 2001, antitrust
was included on the agenda of the Doha Round.42 At the 2003 Cancun Ministerial
meeting, however, the WTO negotiations on antitrust were stalled due to the resistance of
the developing countries. Following the collapse of the negotiations in Cancun, the WTO
General Council decided to officially drop antitrust policy from the Doha Round
negotiation agenda on August 1, 2004.43 There is little to suggest that WTO antitrust
negotiations will be revived anytime soon.
This Section explains why the TRIPs Agreement was successful, why antitrust
negotiations were a failure, and why exactly the outcome of the two sets of issues was so
different.44 It first discusses the general preconditions for successful cooperation—the
great power consensus and the support of influential interest groups—and shows how
these attributes were present in the case of the TRIPs negotiations but were missing in the
case of antitrust negotiations. While the presence of these conditions in the case of TRIPs
is generally recognized, the broad literature advocating a WTO international antitrust
agreement has been surprisingly ignorant of the absence of coherent great power and
interest group support, cultivating unfounded optimism about the prospect of harnessing
the necessary political backing for the WTO antitrust agreement. The below discussion
seeks to explain why no coherent interest group coalition has emerged to support a WTO
antitrust agreement and—maybe even more surprisingly—why powerful states have
repeatedly put antitrust on the WTO’s negotiation agenda even when none of the
influential interest groups have urged them to do so.
The discussion then moves on to examine the WTO-specific preconditions for
successful cooperation in the two areas. It argues that the gains and losses that the TRIPs
Agreement was going to produce were relatively unambiguous prior to the conclusion of
the Agreement, enabling states to design issue linkages that compensated developing
countries that expected to lose from the Agreement. In contrast, antitrust negotiations
have been impeded by substantial uncertainty regarding the prospective winners and
42

Antitrust was one of the so-called “Singapore issues,” together with investment, trade facilitation, and
transparency in government procurement, that were placed on a conditional negotiation track. Being on a
conditional negotiation track made it subject to an explicit decision on the scope and timeframe at the 2003
Cancun Ministerial Conference.
43
See Decision Adopted by the General Council on 1 August 2004, supra note 2.
44
This Article highlights five primary reasons that explain the success of the TRIPs Agreement and the
failure to conclude an antitrust agreement. There are, however, other explanations for why the TRIPs
Agreement was successful. For instance, the political and ideological climate was particularly favorable to
the TRIPs Agreement at the time the negotiations were launched. The neo-classical economic liberalism
dominated the thinking of the international community and the major international institutions in 1980s.
Ronald Reagan’s United States and Margaret Thatcher’s United Kingdom embraced a free-market agenda
that sought to institutionalize deregulation and trade liberalization globally. The GATT Secretariat
endorsed the liberal trade order and sought to regain its relevance in the eyes of the developed countries,
which had begun to bypass the GATT in their economic policymaking after the GATT became preoccupied
with the developing country concerns in early 1980s.) This led the GATT Secretariat to endorse the
developed country agenda, including the TRIPs Agreement. See Sell, supra note 8, at 20.
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losers under the Agreement, obstructing states’ ability to form issue-linkages. Thus, the
existing literature has overestimated the WTO’s ability to resort to linkages, overlooking
that the linkage strategy is contingent on the states’ ability to predict the distributional
consequences of the agreement.
The below discussion also asserts that defection from a prospective agreement
was a concern underlying the TRIPs negotiations whereas the likelihood of cheating and
hence the need for WTO’s enforcement mechanism is a lesser concern in antitrust
negotiations. This claim challenges the prevailing presumption that antitrust cooperation
would also be impeded by incentives to defect from commitments. Finally, the net gains
from the TRIPs Agreement to its proponents were much higher and more certain than the
prospective gains for any state supporting a WTO antitrust agreement. Similarly, the
opportunity costs of not cooperating with respect to IPRs in the WTO were significantly
higher than they were in the case of antitrust where various alternatives for pursuing
regulatory convergence existed.
A. The Power-Politics Explanation: Does the “Great Power Consensus” Exist?
A consensus among great powers regarding the necessity and the content of the
TRIPs Agreement was a defining factor that led to the successful conclusion of the
agreement. In contrast, an accord among great powers was missing in the antitrust
negotiations, contributing to the breakdown of the negotiations.
1.

The Great Power Consensus on the TRIPs Agreement

The great powers are also the leading producers of IP products.45 As unambiguous
beneficiaries of stronger IP protection, they were ardent advocates of the TRIPs
Agreement and pursued their goal as a unified front.46 Stronger international IP
protection was known to reinforce their IP exporters’ position by enabling them to charge
supra-competitive prices of their products abroad. Thus, the TRIPs Agreement was
guaranteed to improve the terms of trade and the national income of the great powers.47
45

The benefits of IP protection are highly concentrated in a few economically powerful developed
countries. According to WIPO, in 2000 the nationals of developed countries owned ninety-three percent of
all patents granted to foreigners. Five countries (the United States, Germany, France, the United Kingdom
and Switzerland) owned seventy-six percent of them, the United States’ share being twenty-six percent.
The United States is the primary beneficiary of IP-related trade. Its net income from IP–related trade
increased from $1.1 billion in 1970 to $14.3 billion in 2001. The pharmaceutical industry is illustrative of
how concentrated the benefits from the TRIPs Agreement were going to be: ninety percent of new
pharmaceutical products originate from the United States, EU or Japan. The three powers also host over
two-thirds of the total world production of pharmaceuticals and account for over ninety percent of the R&D
expenditure in the field. See Meir Perez Pugatch, THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 51, 54 (Edward Elgar 2004).
46
See, e.g., A. O. Adede, The Political Economy of the TRIPs Agreement: Origins and History of
Negotiations 4, 12 (July 30, 2001) (unpublished manuscript, presented at the Eastern and Southern Africa
Multi-Stakeholder Dialogue on Trade, Intellectual Property and Biological Resources, Nairobi, Kenya).
47
Pugatch, supra note 45, at 49. While some substantive disagreements among the great powers existed,
the magnitude of absolute gains available from the TRIPs Agreement superseded any concerns the great
powers harbored about relative gains under the final agreement.
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Since the great powers all supported the TRIPs Agreement, the only true battle
was to persuade the developing countries to sign onto the agreement. Developing
countries had little to gain from the TRIPs Agreement: they are primarily consumers and
copiers of IP-related products. While developed countries argued that the TRIPs
Agreement would benefit developing countries by stimulating innovation and attracting
foreign direct investment, developing countries found such benefits weak, distant, and
uncertain.48 In addition, given the extent of the domestic opposition of the Agreement,
developing countries knew that signing onto the TRIPs was politically costly. Hence, the
TRIPs Agreement seemed to offer no Pareto-gains for developing countries.
If developing countries knew that the TRIPs Agreement was going to reduce their
economic welfare, why did they sign into it? In the WTO, all states have equal voting
rights and the decisions are reached based on the consensus principle. These institutional
safeguards ought to ensure that the great powers cannot impose undesirable agreements
on developing countries. However, a closer examination of the dynamics of the WTO
negotiations reveals that the formal equality of the states often yields to power based
bargaining in practice.
Developing countries refrained from using their veto right for two primary
reasons. First, developing countries already faced trade retaliation from the great powers,
which resorted to coercive tactics in their bilateral relations with them. Prior to TRIPs,
the United States relied primarily on two instruments in pressuring developing countries
to adopt stronger domestic IP laws: first, the denial or withdrawal of the GSP benefits,
which enables certain countries to enjoy preferential treatment (such as lower tariffs) in
their trade relations with the United States; and second, the employment of Section 301
of the 1974 Trade Act, which enables the United States to impose unilateral trade
sanctions against countries that engage in “unfair competition”.49 Thus, developing
countries were confronted with the choice of enduring continuing unilateral trade
retaliation from the United States (and to a lesser degree from the EU) or accepting a
multilateral IP regime where the United States’ ability to unilaterally retaliate against
them would be constrained by the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism.
Second, developing countries had no choice but to accept the TRIPs Agreement
because of a “single undertaking” approach that the great powers successfully pursued to
close the Uruguay Round.50 In contrast to the previous trade negotiation rounds, which
had allowed states to opt out of trade agreements that they did not want to be bound by,
the single undertaking approach meant that the acceptance of the entire set of the
48

Id. at 55 (citing Arvind Subramanian, Putting Some Numbers on the TRIPs Pharmaceutical Debate, 10
INT’L J. TECH. MGMT. 252, 252-53 (1995)). Several studies supported this perception. Subramanian, for
instance, has calculated that annual welfare loss from grant of patents would amount to $100-$400 million
in Argentina and $341 million to $1.26 billion in India.
49
On several occasions, the United States issued specific threats—at times carrying out such threats—by
coercing developing countries to agree to a higher level of IP protection. See Pugatch, supra note 45, at 67,
72 (noting the United States’ successful attempts to coerce Korea and Brazil). See also United States Tariff
Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2006).
50
Steinberg, supra note 7, at 360.
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Uruguay Round agreements—including the TRIPs Agreement—was a precondition for
any benefits negotiated in the GATT as well as the membership in the newly established
WTO.51 To compel all states to accept the Final Act of the Uruguay Round and join the
WTO, the United States and the EU withdrew from their 1947 GATT obligations and
terminated their trade obligations vis-à-vis states that did not accept the Final Act. By
doing this, the two trade powers presented developing countries with a new choice set
from which the status quo was removed. Developing countries had to decide whether to
sign the TRIPs Agreement or forgo all the benefits they had negotiated in the previous
fifty years. Developing countries, obviously, could not afford to choose the latter.52
The history of the TRIPs negotiations exposes the role that power plays in
negotiations that are formally guided by the principle of equal rights and consensus
among all states. That the great powers acted jointly in pursuit of a commonly defined
goal paved the way for the TRIPs Agreement and allowed them to overcome the
developing countries’ initial resistance. The tactics they used might not have amounted to
overt coercion. However, by changing the opportunity set available for developing
countries, developed countries effectively left developing countries with little choice but
to sign onto the agreement that was not Pareto-improving to them. Great powers are still
able to dictate the negotiation agenda, the bargaining process, and the final outcome,
challenging the institutionalist paradigm that assumes that international institutions are
Pareto-improving and facilitate mutual gains for all states.53

51

GATT refers to the “General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade” which was concluded in 1947. It is a
predesessor of the WTO. Today, the WTO provides a treaty framework for various agreements, including
GATT.
52
Id. The United States and European Union’s exit strategy resembles Lloyd Gruber’s theory of “go-italone” power. Gruber contests the positive-sum models of international cooperation and explains why
states join institutions that are not Pareto-improving for them. He argues that states that stand to lose from
cooperative arrangements know that winners often can proceed without them. Thus, the winners can “go-italone” and the new arrangement will materialize irrespective of the losing states’ support, changing the
institutional landscape in which the losing states operate. This changes the losing states’ interest calculation
and causes them to join the new institution even though they would have preferred that such an institution
never materialized in the first place. Thus, while the TRIPs Agreement did not offer any Pareto-gains for
developing countries, it was strategically better for developing countries to join the WTO which
incorporated the TRIPs Agreement than for them to give up all their hard-earned trade benefits. See
generally LLOYD GRUBER, RULING THE WORLD: POWER POLITICS AND THE RISE OF SUPRANATIONAL
INSTITUTIONS (2000).
53
Id. at 704. Daniel Drezner, Globalization, Harmonization, and Competition: The Different Pathways to
Policy Convergence, 12 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 841 (2005). Pugatch, supra note 45, at 228.
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2.

The Great Power Divide on International Antitrust Cooperation

In contrast to the great power consensus over the international IP regime, one of
the primary obstacles to a binding international antitrust agreement has been a
longstanding disagreement between the United States and the EU regarding the content
and institutional form of the international antitrust cooperation. The United States has
repeatedly stated its opposition to the WTO antitrust rules, while the EU has been their
strongest advocate.54
The United States and EU positions on how to protect IPRs are more closely
aligned than their views on how to protect their markets from anti-competitive practices.
Even as the United States and EU antitrust laws are gradually converging, disagreement
on the optimal content of antitrust laws remains. This disagreement stems from a
different belief on when and how a government should intervene when markets fail. In
general, the EU is considered to be more interventionist and less tolerant of market
power. Consequently, the EU is more likely to challenge mergers and pursue the conduct
of a dominant corporation. The divergent outcomes in the Microsoft dominance case and
the GE/Honeywell merger case are often cited as most prominent examples of the
remaining transatlantic differences.55
The U.S.-EU divergence has obstructed states’ abilities to negotiate antitrust
matters in the WTO. The initial proposal to incorporate antitrust in the WTO originated
from the EU, which has remained the agreement’s vocal proponent. The United States, in
contrast, has systematically opposed any WTO antitrust agreement and supported
bilateral cooperation agreements and voluntary multilateral cooperation within the
International Competition Network (“ICN”), a voluntary network among worlds’ antitrust
agencies, instead.56 The EU’s support for formal WTO negotiations stems from a variety
54

See, e.g., Douglas Melamed, Antitrust Enforcement in a Global Economy, Address at the Fordham
Corporate Law Institute 25th Annual Conference on International Antitrust Law and Policy (Oct. 22,
1998); Mario Monti, European Commissioner for Competition Policy, A Global Competition Policy?,
Address at the European Competition Day Conference (Sept. 17, 2002).
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On Microsoft, see, e.g., Commission Decision, Microsoft, COMP/C-3/37.792, 2004 O.J. (C 290),
available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/cases/decisions/37792/en.pdf (imposing a fine
after concluding that Microsoft had abused its dominant position in violation of Art. 82 EC); United States
District Court for the District of Columbia, Memorandum Opinion with Findings of Fact and Final
Judgment of November 1, 2002, In re State of New York et al. v. Microsoft Corporation, Civil Action No.
98-1233 (CKK); United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Memorandum Opinion with
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Corporation, Civil Action No. 98-1233 (CKK) (endorsing the settlement between the United States and
Microsoft). On GE/Honeywell, see Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Justice Department Requires
Divestitures in Merger Between General Electric and Honeywell (May 2, 2001), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2001/8140.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2010); Commission
Decision of 3 July 2001, General Electric/Honeywell, Case COMP/M.2220.
56
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available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/icpac/finalreport.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2010); William J. Kolasky,
Global Competition: Prospects for Convergence and Cooperation, Address at the American Bar
Association Fall Forum (Nov. 7, 2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/200446.htm
(last visited Mar. 2, 2010).
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of factors, including its preference for multilateral, institutionalized rulemaking over less
predictable, case-by-case cooperation among regulators. The EU is also willing to link
antitrust more closely to trade policy, whereas the United States wants to keep the two
issues separate. In addition, as more WTO members are moving towards adopting EUstyle (as opposed to U.S.-style) antitrust laws, the EU perceives the antitrust cooperation
within the WTO as an opportunity to institutionalize its own preferred regulatory regime
internationally.
International cooperation is more likely to fail when great powers are divided.
However, antitrust negotiations were not obstructed only because of the United States
opposition: at the 2003 Cancun Ministerial meeting, the negotiations were blocked by the
coalition of developing countries. While developing countries would arguably have been
the greatest beneficiaries of the international antitrust agreement, the regulatory burden
and resulting compliance costs turned developing countries against the agreement.
Without adequate resources or legal and economic expertise to enforce antitrust laws, the
developing countries concluded that they were not ready to negotiate the WTO antitrust
agreement.57
The Cancun failure shows that developing countries can sometimes successfully
offset some of the great powers’ bargaining advantage by forming coalitions that veto
specific proposals and thereby compromise the leverage that the great powers have over
outcomes.58 Resource pooling helps weaker states gain more diplomatic clout, since their
combined market size translates directly into more bargaining power.59 In particular,
when the interests of the great powers are divided, developing countries can more
effectively counter the pressure that a fragmented great power coalition exercises.
In the ongoing Doha Round, the United States and the EU have been unable to
dominate the negotiations. They have often found themselves in opposing alliances.60
When the United States and the EU have not acted in concert, developing countries have
taken advantage of the great power divide and obstructed the negotiations, despite the
57

Developing countries also expected to incur political costs from the agreement, since import-competing
industries or former state monopolies were likely to resist strict antitrust laws removing their existing
government protection. Developing countries also failed to see the agreement on antitrust as a development
priority in light of more pressing socio-economic problems that would need to be addressed. See also
Editorial, The Real Lesson of the Cancun Failure, FINANCIAL TIMES, Sept. 23, 2003, at 16.
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The “G20,” a coalition of developing countries (not to be confused with the G20 that refers to the Group
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Manfred Elsig, Different Facets of Power in Decision-Making in the WTO 25-28 (Sept. 2006)
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significant opportunity costs that the failure of the Doha Round—antitrust agreement
included—presents to them. Ironically, it seems that the power divide in antitrust has
prevented states from signing an agreement that could be Pareto-improving to all.61

B.

The Political Economy Explanation: Do Strong Domestic Interest Groups
Support the International Agreement?

The TRIPs Agreement emerged following an unprecedented interest group
pressure as influential MNCs promoted the inclusion of the IPRs into the WTO agenda.62
In contrast, few corporations, industry organizations or consumer groups have actively
endorsed a WTO antitrust agreement. Instead, the demand for international antitrust rules
has stemmed from a small number of prominent antitrust agencies while individual
corporations have focused their lobbying efforts on domestic antitrust agencies in cases
where their interests have been directly and individually at stake.63
1. The Interest Groups’ Quest for the TRIPs Agreement
The TRIPs Agreement was going to improve the terms of trade for the great
powers that were and continue to be the major exporters of IP products. In addition,
within those countries, those gains were going to be captured by a distinctly defined
group of producers whose commercial success relies on vigorous IP protection. These
producers became the primary norm entrepreneurs of the TRIPs Agreement. They formed
a transnational coalition and engaged in an unprecedented lobbying effort to establish a
global IP regime.64
The support of powerful MNCs does not, as such, guarantee that those private
interests are translated into government policies and ultimately into public international
law. While private interests prevailed in the TRIPs negotiations, the triumph of the
MNCs in devising the global trade order has not stretched across all issue areas. The
General Agreement on Trade in Services (“GATS”) and the Agreement on Trade-Related
Investment Measures (“TRIMS”), for instance, which were supported by many of the
same interests groups and which took place at the same time with the TRIPs negotiations
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in the same institutional framework fell short of the demands of the private sector.65
Accordingly, it appears that the TRIPs Agreement was a product of a distinct set of
circumstances that made the Agreement particularly susceptible for a high level of
lobbying activity.
Interest groups assumed a prominent role in the TRIPs talks because of
particularly high benefits that they expected to receive from their lobbying activity. The
pharmaceutical industry, for instance, is highly dependent on effective patent protection.
According to some estimates, average costs for developing a new drug are $500–$800
million. Only three out of ten marketable drugs produce profits that exceed the average
costs of their research and development. It is also estimated that 60–65 percent of drugs
would have never been developed in the absence of IP protection.66 Thus, the high stakes
involved in securing enhanced IP protection increased the expected utility available from
the lobbying activity.
Second, the lobbying was particularly attractive since the benefits were to fall on
a small and coherent interest group.67 Lobby groups are most effective when they have
homogeneous interests.68 Corporations supporting the TRIPs Agreement came from
highly concentrated business sectors, allowing them to construct a unified cross-industry
position.69 The limited number of members and a clear sectoral definition of the industry
lobby diminished the danger of conflicting interests and kept the lobbying coalition
cohesive in its mission and in the strategies pursued.70 The need to secure global IP
protection provided a powerful common denominator for the industry and a solid basis
for cooperation. The joint gains available to the industry from the TRIPs Agreement
superseded any relative gains that the corporations were hoping to secure as each other’s
competitors.71
65
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Finally, the costs of collective action, which can at times undermine interest
groups’ ability to pursue their interests, never became a major obstacle for the TRIPs
lobby. The TRIPs lobby consisted of a particularly resourceful group of corporations that
were able to sustain high lobbying costs since the industry benefits from high marginal
profits. Also, the prospect of free riding, which is one of the primary costs of collective
action for interest groups, was diminished because the interest group was small, coherent,
and sectorally defined.72 Such a homogeneous group with limited membership is better
able to mitigate collective action problems involved in lobbying, reducing the costs,
increasing the utility, and thus enhancing the overall attractiveness of lobbying.
The effectiveness of the TRIPs lobby and, consequently, the extent of political
rents available from the TRIPs Agreement provided the governments of the most
powerful trading nations an apparent domestic political economy rationale for the
Agreement.73 In the end, the transnational coalition lobbying for the TRIPs Agreement
was successful beyond its initial goals. The comprehensiveness of the TRIPs Agreement
superseded even the initial expectations of the MNCs supporting the Agreement, setting
the TRIPs lobby apart from most other instances where private corporations have been
actively lobbying for international regimes.
Consequently, the emergence of the TRIPs Agreement can be explained as a
manifestation of some of the world’s most powerful corporations acting in concert with
the world’s most powerful economies.74 The views presented by the leading powers in
the WTO mirrored closely the views advanced by their domestic industries.75 The
governments became agents of the domestic IPR lobby, which not only devised the
global IPR agenda and developed a strategy to realize it, but also steered governments
through the negotiation process toward an outcome that closely aligned with the interests
of the IP-industry.

72
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2. The Agency-Driven Pursuit of International Antitrust Rules
In contrast to the TRIPs negotiations, private interests have been largely absent
from the quest for WTO antitrust rules. Few corporations, industry organizations, or
consumer groups have endorsed the agreement.76 The international antitrust regime does
not seem to have a clear constituency that would unequivocally benefit from the WTO
antitrust rules and therefore, there is no equivalent stakeholder to assume the role played
by the IP industry in its pursuit for the TRIPs Agreement. In the absence of strong
domestic interest group support, governments have not invested their political capital in
negotiating an agreement that would confer limited, if any, political rents to them.
As a constituency, consumers seem to be the only group that would benefit from
antitrust action in most, if not all cases. This is because antitrust laws in most
jurisdictions are enacted to maximize consumer welfare. However, consumers as
beneficiaries of antitrust regulation form a fragmented interest group. Consumer
organizations representing the interests of individual consumers have also assumed a
passive role in the debate on international antitrust rules, focusing their lobbying
activities on less “technocratic” areas of cooperation instead.77
What explains then the relative passiveness of corporations in the antitrust
domain? The stakes in international antitrust cases would seem high. The costs involved
in EU Commission’s prohibition of the proposed GE/Honeywell merger between two
U.S. corporations, for instance, were extremely high, as have been the litigation costs and
remedies Microsoft has faced in Europe even when the U.S. antitrust agencies have
cleared these corporations’ transactions and conduct as pro-competitive. Negotiating an
international agreement to mitigate the costs associated with inconsistent domestic
antitrust laws would thus be expected to confer high benefits for at least some powerful
corporations that seek consolidation or frequently face investigations by multiple antitrust
agencies. However, no coherent coalition has emerged to support a WTO antitrust
agreement.78
The inactivity of interest groups in the antitrust domain can be explained by the
diffuse, case-specific, and often unpredictable nature of the costs and the benefits that a
WTO antitrust agreement would confer. For instance, vigorous antitrust enforcement is
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likely to be in the interest of a corporation, as long as the authorities across jurisdictions
are targeting its competitors. However, when any given corporation itself becomes a
target of an antitrust investigation, its position toward international antitrust cooperation
is likely to reverse.79 This leads most corporations to be of two minds about increased
international antitrust regulation, depending on which side of the dispute they stand in
each individual case.80 Thus, the benefit that any all-encompassing WTO antitrust
agreement would confer is uncertain for a corporation contemplating political action.
More specifically, the benefit would seem to vary from case to case, sometimes being
even negative. When a corporation cannot determine ex ante whether and how much it
would benefit from an agreement, it is less likely to engage in lobbying activity.
From the point of view of interest groups, the key difference between the TRIPs
and the antitrust negotiations is that in the case of antitrust, the costs and the benefits of
cross-border antitrust disputes fall on a single firm, not on a single industry. Lobbying for
or against antitrust regulation thus becomes a private good rather than a policy pursued
by an entire industry.81 This leads to the absence of industry-wide coalitions and moves
the lobbying activity to the sphere of domestic agencies’ investigations in individual
cases.
Accordingly, corporations are likely to choose case-by-case the issues and
instances in which they want antitrust agencies to cooperate. They employ their political
strength vis-à-vis antitrust authorities when their interests are directly at stake.82 This type
of political action is rational given the higher expected utility available from lobbying in
an individual case. When lobbying is considered a private good, there are no (or at most
few) other firms engaged in political activity.83 While all the costs of political action fall
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on a single firm, there is less free riding that could add to the costs of collective action.84
Also, the benefits of lobbying are likely to be higher. A corporation is better able to
determine the extent of its benefits on a case-by-case basis and adjust the level of its
optimal lobbying activity accordingly in each case. The benefit from lobbying is also
expected to be higher given that the likelihood of a single firm determining an outcome is
greater in the absence of multiple, competing interests within a coalition. Finally, and
perhaps most importantly, a single firm can accumulate all of the benefits when an
agency decides in its favor.
In the absence of interest groups supporting the WTO antitrust agreement, it
remains unclear why there still have been attempts to negotiate international antitrust
rules. It is puzzling that powerful countries place certain regulatory issues continuously
on the WTO negotiation agenda even when the key domestic constituency does not
demand the agreement and when the prospects of reaching an agreement are slim.
Interestingly, while the norm entrepreneurs behind the TRIPs Agreement were MNCs,
the driving forces behind the antitrust negotiations have been a few domestic antitrust
agencies, supported by the broader trade community. Most prominently, the demand for
WTO antitrust rules stems from the EU Commission and its antitrust enforcers. The trade
officials at U.S. Trade Representative and the EU’s Directorate General for Trade have
equally supported the inclusion of antitrust within the WTO. Incorporating antitrust in the
WTO would enhance trade officials’ powers as antitrust would become a “trade matter,”
giving them the opportunity to ensure that antitrust laws are not employed so as to offset
the liberalization commitments they have negotiated in the trade domain. Thus, the
pursuit for antitrust cooperation has been agency-driven as opposed to interest-group
driven.
That agencies pursue regulatory cooperation contrary to the preferences of
domestic interest groups departs from the standard political economy models, which
assume that states are neutral aggregators of interest group preferences. Instead, the
agency-driven antitrust cooperation suggests that states can be autonomous actors that
develop preferences on their own and that pursue policy goals which do not necessarily
reflect the demands of interest groups.85
C.

Linkage Explanation: Are Linkages Feasible and Will They Create or Destroy a
Zone of an Agreement?
1. Linkages Paving the Way for the TRIPs Agreement

In the TRIPs negotiations, it was evident that the developed countries, where the
majority of the R&D takes place, were going to be the beneficiaries of the agreement and
84

Free riding is not an option for a corporation whose interests are directly and individually at stake at a
given investigation, as no other corporation has the interest of lobbying on its behalf. Note, however, that
antitrust agencies can at times free ride on each other’s investigations. Developing countries, for instance,
benefit if the United States or the EU blocks a merger that also impedes competition on that edeveloping
country market.
85
Theda Skocpol, Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research, in BRINGING THE
STATE BACK IN (Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschmeyer & Theda Skocpol eds., Cambridge 1985).

24

that the developing countries, where IP-protected products are mainly consumed or
copied, were going to lose under the agreement.86 Thus, the main challenge in the TRIPs
negotiations was to overcome the distributional conflict and win the support of the
developing countries which had little to gain and much to lose under the TRIPs
Agreement.
Developing countries were eventually brought into the agreement by linking the
TRIPs negotiations to concessions in other areas.87 As a transfer payment, developed
countries agreed to cut down subsidies to their own farmers and lower their tariffs on
agricultural products and textiles that the developing countries imported.88 This strategic
linkage of two unrelated issues converted the “win-lose” bargaining game to a “win-win”
game where developed and developing countries exchanged balanced concessions in the
spirit of reciprocity.89
This situation resembles a classic Prisoners’ Dilemma situation. Developing
countries face a choice of either offering or refusing IP protection. Developed countries
face a choice of either retaining the current level of their existing agricultural subsidies or
reducing them. Developed countries could individually obtain the highest payoff by
retaining their agricultural subsidies, if developing countries unilaterally agreed to a
higher level of IP protection. In contrast, the developing countries would individually
obtain the highest payoff by not enacting IP regulation yet having developed countries
unilaterally cut their subsidies. Both parties’ best individual strategies, however, leave the
other party with the lowest possible payoff.
In this setting, both sets of countries prefer a mutual linkage where the developed
countries cut subsidies and developing countries provide IP protection to a situation
where developed countries maintain their subsidies and developing countries fail to
provide IP protection. The mutual linkage also leads to the maximization of social
welfare given that the combined payoff of the parties is higher than the payoff resulting
from any other strategy. However, both parties retain an offensive and defensive
incentive to defect from the linkage equilibrium in an effort to exploit the other party and
increase their individual payoffs. Thus, the fear of the other party’s defection pulls both
parties toward non-cooperative strategies.90 Thus, absent an agreement, the parties end up
in a Pareto-deficient equilibrium where the developed countries retain their agricultural
subsidies and developing countries fail to offer IP protection.
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Since both parties prefer an alternative equilibrium, either player can promise to
eschew its dominant strategy if the other player reciprocates. Thus, developed countries
can promise to cut down their agricultural subsidies if developing countries agree to offer
IP protection. This mutually beneficial linkage allows both players to move from a
Pareto-deficient equilibrium to one which offers both parties their second-best outcome.
However, the new equilibrium is difficult to sustain, since both parties retain an incentive
to defect from the agreement. Therefore, parties are likely to seek binding commitments
and institutionalized rules to enforce the linkage in the event of a unilateral defection.91
This need for credible, enforceable linkage commitments explains the relative
attractiveness of the WTO in this particular strategic situation.
While a strategic linkage in an institutionalized setting such as the WTO can be a
powerful tool to solve a distributional conflict, the linkage strategy is not always feasible.
The presence of ex ante transparency regarding the distributional consequences of the
agreement forms an important precondition for the successful use of strategic linkages.
To exchange reciprocal concessions and form issue-linkages, states must know which
state ought to compensate the other and by how much. Thus, states must be able to
identify the winners and losers from an agreement prior to its conclusion and have some
sense of the magnitude of the gains and the losses that the agreement is expected to
generate.92
The distributional consequences of the TRIPs Agreement were sufficiently clear
and quantifiable ex ante. For instance, the International Trade Commission estimated that
the losses of 193 U.S.-based firms from piracy amounted to $ 23.8 billion in 1986, the
year the Uruguay Round was launched. The EU estimated that counterfeiting comprises
5–7 % of the world trade and accounts for the loss of 100,000 jobs annually in the EU.93
While these estimates have been contested and the exact effect of the TRIPs Agreement
and its ability to remove or mitigate these trends was debatable, a high degree of certainty
remained regarding the magnitude of the benefits and losses that the TRIPs Agreement
would bring about. Even more certain was the direction to which any compensation ought
to flow. Information regarding the identities and the nationalities of all patent holders is
transparent. Nobody disputed that the majority of the TRIPs beneficiaries resided in the
developed countries whereas the majority of the TRIPs losers resided in the developing
countries. As discussed above, 90% of new pharmaceutical products originate from the
U.S., EU, or Japan, as do most other IP-driven products. These countries were known to
be unambiguous winners of the TRIPs Agreement and thus expected to offer transfer
payments to balance the concessions extracted from developing countries. Thus, the
predictability of the Agreement’s distributional consequences paved the way for the
linkages, which again paved the way for the conclusion of the Agreement.
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2. Distributional Uncertainty and the Infeasibility of Linkages to Facilitate the
Antitrust Agreement
Not unlike the TRIPs negotiations, antitrust cooperation has been marked by
distributional tensions between the United States and the EU on one hand and between
the developed and the developing countries on the other. Thus, unsurprisingly, linkages
in the WTO have been proposed as a solution to overcome the distributional tensions in
the antitrust domain. Proponents of the WTO antitrust agreement claim that existing
distributional conflicts could be solved by compensating the losing states in another area
of cooperation.94
However, linkages are particularly difficult to devise in the antitrust context.95
Unlike in the case of TRIPs, where IP producers comprised a clear group of winners and
IP consumers comprised an equally unambiguous group of losers, the gains and losses
available to the corporations that would be the targets of international antitrust regulation
are ambiguous. The costs and benefits arising from an international antitrust agreement
for its primary stakeholders are thus likely to be diffuse, issue- and case-specific and, in
most cases, unpredictable. This type of distributional uncertainty obstructs states’ ability
to exchange reciprocal concessions and form issue linkages.
When corporations cannot predict which general policy will favor them more in
the long run, they are less likely to support any all-embracing policy proposal.96 For the
same reason that uncertainty relating to the distributional consequences inhibited the
formation of a cohesive coalition to support the antitrust agreement, the uncertainty
relating to the winners and the losers of the agreement has prevented the formation of
issue linkages. If states do not know in advance who will ultimately win and who will
lose from the agreement, it is impossible for them to assess the extent and the direction of
any transfer payments to address those unknown distributional effects.
In addition to showing how underlying distributional uncertainty can temper the
usefulness of linkages, the failed antitrust negotiations highlight another challenge of the
linkage strategy. Multi-issue negotiations are always more costly and cumbersome than
single-issue negotiations. To devise linkages in the presence of such complexity is no
small task.97 States need more information to assess the costs and benefits of various
agreements. Adding new issues to the negotiation increases the bureaucracy involved as
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new government agencies are brought to the bargaining table.98 Linkages are always
counter-productive if the benefits generated by the linkage do not exceed the costs
involved in bringing additional issues into the bargaining process.99
Conventional political economy models often assume that negotiations do not
have transaction costs. As long as losing parties can at least theoretically be compensated
with the help of transfer payments, efficient agreements are expected to materialize.
Linkages should therefore only facilitate negotiations. However, when transaction costs
involved in issue linkages are introduced in the analysis, the contracting costs involved in
negotiating multi-issue deals rise and prospect of reaching an agreement diminish.
At worst, linkages can transform a simple bargaining situation into a complex,
unsolvable one.100 While linkages are able to foster agreements which would otherwise
fail due to distributional divisions, linkages can have the opposite effect of collapsing the
entire negotiation, in particular when non-negotiable issues are brought to the negotiation
table.101 New issues mobilize novel domestic interest groups with additional demands
that can complicate negotiations. For instance, an initial decision between States A and B
to link issues x and y to overcome their distributional conflict can create the need for
additional transfer payments if interest groups in State C are also affected by y and
demand the linking of issue z as a condition for accepting the agreement on issues x and
y. The increase in the number of issues adds to the complexity of the transfer payments
required for their joint solution, inevitably rendering the negotiations more difficult to
manage.
Linking antitrust negotiations to other “Singapore issues,” including trade
facilitation, investment protection, and transparency in government procurement in
addition to antitrust policy, contributed to the failure to launch negotiations on
antitrust.102 In addition to antitrust, developing countries objected an agreement on
investment and government procurement. However, developed countries, in particular the
EU, refused to unpack the single undertaking and separate the Singapore Issues from one
another, misestimating their ability to get developing countries on board to all the areas
of contention.103 While antitrust negotiations had little chance of being saved at this
point, the EU’s insistence in the package deal sealed the inevitable collapse of the
negotiations.
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3. Concluding Remarks on the Effects of a Linkage Strategy
Both antitrust and TRIPs negotiations were marked by deep distributional
conflicts. While linkages were successfully employed to resolve the distributional
conflict in the case of TRIPs, they were unsuccessful in the case of antitrust. Linkages
can be a powerful tool to overcome a distributional conflict and forge an agreement when
a consensus within a single issue area is not feasible. Many linked issues can promote
cooperation, since there are more opportunities for mutual gains. Thus, the more palpable
the distributional consequences underlying the issue, the more likely the states are to
pursue its solution in the WTO through an issue linkage. In contrast, less controversial
issues that do not present distributional conflicts are more likely to be resolved as a single
issue in a bilateral context.104
Linkages are not, however, always available to help states forge an agreement.
When considerable uncertainty marks the negotiations, forming linkages is difficult, if
not impossible. Preconditions for effective linkage bargains include predictability relating
to the identity of winners and losers as well as some understanding of the magnitude of
positive or negative consequences that an agreement is expected to generate. Thus, the
WTO can only forge an agreement with the help of the linkage strategy when there is
little uncertainty regarding the gains and losses that the agreement would generate. In
addition to the problem of distributional uncertainty, sheer complexity introduced by
issue linkages can sometimes offset the potential benefits of issue linkages. Multiple
issues can obstruct progress on issues that could have been solved in isolation. At worst,
too broad of a negotiation agenda can bring down an entire round, transforming a
prospect of a grand bargain into a grand failure.105
D.

Enforcement Explanation: How Likely is Opportunistic Behavior?

The likelihood of opportunistic behavior is another key variable distinguishing
international IP cooperation from international antitrust cooperation. When negotiating
the TRIPs Agreement, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism was seen as crucial in
ensuring that no state would defect from their international commitments.106 In contrast, I
have elsewhere argued that the likelihood of cheating from international antitrust rules
would be low.107 Consequently, the WTO’s enforcement powers were more germane in
the context of international IP protection than they were in the case of international
antitrust cooperation, further explaining why the TRIPs Agreement materialized in the
WTO but the negotiations on WTO antitrust agreement stalled early in the process.
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1. The Incentives to Defect from the TRIPs Agreement
The WTO, and in particular its DSM, constitutes the most attractive venue for
cooperation in PD situations when states are concerned about the prospect of cheating
once the agreement is concluded. In a PD situation, each state has the incentive to defect
from the agreement, since it can increase its individual payoff by taking advantage of the
other party’s cooperation while refusing to cooperate itself.
Many international trade issues can be modeled as PDs.108 Consider, for example,
the regulation of tariffs that states can employ at their borders. While all states would be
better off under free trade, a state can shift the terms of trade in its favor by raising its
tariffs while still benefiting from the low tariffs of its trading partner. In the absence of an
international agreement proscribing such conduct (and an enforcement mechanism to
guarantee states’ adherence to the agreement), states’ incentives to maximize individual
payoffs at the expense of jointly optimal policies would lead to an equilibrium where all
states would raise their tariffs, rendering every state worse off.
The fear of defection was an important aspect of the strategic situation
characterizing the TRIPs negotiations, leading developed countries to pursue legally
binding, enforceable commitments within the WTO. Prior to the TRIPs Agreement, the
World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”) provided a forum for negotiating
international IPR rules.109 However, the WIPO failed to provide adequately strong
substantive rules or a mechanism for their enforcement,110 which was the primary reason
developed countries sought to move much of the international IP rulemaking from the
WIPO to the WTO framework.
Had states not linked the TRIPs Agreement to the other items on the trade agenda,
the negotiations over IP would most likely have resembled a one-sided PD where
developed countries and developing countries would have had different strategy sets and
asymmetric payoffs. While the developing countries would have had both offensive and
defensive incentives to cheat from their IP commitments, the developed countries would
have only defected defensively by resorting to trade sanctions in response to developing
countries’ defection.111 However, when the TRIPs negotiations were explicitly linked to
negotiations on agricultural trade and trade in textiles, the one-sided PD was converted to
a more classical symmetrical PD where the incentive to defect existed for both parties.
Assuming the other party’s continuing cooperation, developed countries would have
obtained the highest individual payoff by defecting from their commitment to cut down
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agricultural subsidies. Similarly, developing countries would have obtained the highest
individual payoff by defecting from their IP commitments. Thus, from the outset, the
pursuit of the TRIPs Agreement within the WTO was motivated by the states’ ability to
resort to the DSM to contain the other states’ incentives to defect from the agreement.
When opportunistic behavior is likely and the availability of sanctions therefore
relevant, it is still unclear why a powerful country would choose to pursue cooperation in
the WTO instead of resorting to unilateral retaliation. If the United States and the EU
could have pressured developing countries into adopting IP laws without offering any
trade concessions in return, why did they turn to the WTO? Pursuing an agreement within
the WTO seemed to have two downsides for the great powers: they were forced to offer
transfer payments to the developing countries in return for extracting IPR commitments
from them and, by subjecting themselves to the WTO’s DSM, the great powers curtailed
their ability to unilaterally retaliate.
For instance, instead of forming linkages in the WTO, the United States could
have continued its previous practice of threatening developing countries with unilateral
trade sanctions based on Section 301 of the United States Trade Act of 1974. Similarly,
the United States could have threatened to further withdraw developing countries’ GSP
privileges, which grants developing countries lower tariff rates if they import into
developed countries.
However, it is unclear whether unilateral threats (with the possibility of unilateral
sanctions) are a better strategy for the United States or the EU than linkages backed by
the WTO’s DSM. While there are examples of states offering higher levels of IP
protection under unilateral great power pressure, such threats and sanctions have not been
that effective overall. Developing countries’ record of complying with threats in the IP
domain is mixed, reducing the United States and EU’s confidence that a mere threat
would be sufficient to bring about desired regulatory changes. Meanwhile, aggressive
unilateralism is also a costlier strategy to sustain in the long run.112
2. The Self-Enforcing Nature of International Antitrust Cooperation
Those who support a WTO antitrust agreement cite defection as an important
reason to pursue a binding agreement. The existing literature seems to suggest that the
strategic setting underlying international antitrust cooperation would have the
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characteristics of a PD.113 Andrew Guzman, for instance, argues that in setting their
domestic antitrust laws, states “externalize the costs and internalize the benefits of the
exercise of market power across borders” to maximize their national interest.114 Guzman
expects net-importer countries to employ stricter-than-optimal antitrust standards, since
they decline to internalize costs that are borne by foreign producers that the strict antitrust
laws target.115 Conversely, net-exporter countries enact laxer-than-optimal antitrust laws,
since the costs of the lax enforcement fall on foreign consumers. The alleged existence of
this type of “trade flow bias” leads Guzman to conclude that a WTO antitrust agreement
is needed to overcome these sub-optimal domestic antitrust laws. Guzman also maintains
that domestic antitrust enforcement is characterized by exemptions for domestic
corporations (statutory bias) and discriminatory enforcement practices vis-à-vis foreign
corporations (enforcement bias).
I have elsewhere developed a detailed argument for why antitrust enforcement is
not driven by trade flow bias, statutory bias, or a notable enforcement bias, and for why
states are therefore less likely to behave opportunistically when enforcing their domestic
antitrust laws.116 The argument on the alleged trade flow bias appears least convincing.
The existence of “effects doctrine” as a basis for antitrust jurisdiction limits states’ ability
to engage in such a bias. No state enjoys an exclusive jurisdiction to in antitrust cases.117
Regardless of the nationality or location of a corporation, every state with an antitrust law
is entitled to establish antitrust jurisdiction on a corporation, as long as the anticompetitive conduct of that corporation has an “effect” in the domestic market of that
particular country.118 Thus, a net-exporter’s ability to strategically enact overly lax
antitrust laws that give a free pass on its exporters is compromised by the concurrent
jurisdiction of the importing country.
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The arguments about alleged statutory bias seem more plausible, but a closer
examination of domestic antitrust statutes shows this type of bias to be rare in practice.
Domestic antitrust statutes do not explicitly favor local firms over foreign ones. However,
several jurisdictions do exempt export cartels119 from their antitrust laws, which could
amount to an example of a statutory bias. The opportunistic antitrust policies embedded
in the export cartel exemptions are nonetheless mitigated, since the importing country can
always target the export cartel under its own antitrust laws if competition on the
importing country’s domestic market is adversely affected.120 The country exempting
export cartels from its jurisdiction cannot therefore effectively shield its cartel from
another country’s antitrust investigation. Moreover, since export cartel exemptions are
increasingly rare today, they are unlikely to significantly impede competition and
international trade.121 Consequently, the PD incentives associated with export cartels
hinder international antitrust cooperation marginally, at best.
It seems conceivable that antitrust enforcers might deliberately overlook the anticompetitive conduct of domestic corporations in individual instances while
disproportionately targeting foreign corporations. Suspicions in this regard were
reinforced when the EU in 2001 prohibited a proposed acquisition involving two U.S.based companies, Honeywell and General Electric, after the U.S. authorities had already
approved the acquisition. The EU’s decision added force to accusations that the EU
antitrust enforcement protected European interests and was hostile toward U.S.
corporations.122 A broader inquiry into the EU antitrust authorities’ merger decisions,
however, does not reveal any systematic bias against U.S. corporations. In fact, while
twenty-five of the merger notifications the EU Commission received in 1995-2005
involved at least one U.S.-based company, only twelve percent of the prohibited mergers
involved a U.S. corporation. Similarly, only seventeen percent of the mergers that were
withdrawn after the notification involved a U.S. corporation, twenty-six percent of the
Commission’s initiated phase II investigations (“second request”) involved a U.S.
corporation, and twenty-seven percent of the conditional clearances were granted in cases
that involved a U.S. company. These numbers suggest that any enforcement bias would
be limited to a small number of individual cases, or that enforcement bias may not even
exist.
119
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In the absence of strong incentives for opportunistic behavior, I have argued that
international antitrust cooperation has been obstructed by the existence of a distributional
problem as opposed to a defection problem. The distributional problem arises when the
costs and the benefits of an international antitrust agreement would be unevenly
distributed among states. In this coordination game (“CG”) setting states expect to benefit
from a coordinated global antitrust regime but fail to agree on the type of regime that
ought to be adopted. This conflict over the focal point of coordination makes an
agreement difficult to reach.
For instance, both the United States and the EU acknowledge that a more
harmonized international antitrust regime could reduce transaction costs and increase
economic efficiency and legal certainty. Both countries expect to benefit from a more
effective pursuit of international cartels and dominant companies whose conduct span
across several markets. Similarly, harmonized merger control procedures would lead to
transaction cost savings, diminish delays, and improve legal certainty, since corporations
would not face multiple jurisdictions with different substantive and procedural antitrust
regimes. Thus, international coordination is assumed to generate aggregate and individual
benefits for both the United States and the EU. The two antitrust powers, however,
disagree as to the precise content and the form of the international agreement.123 While
the United States would like all countries to converge to the U.S. model of antitrust laws,
the EU prefers convergence to its own antitrust laws. This is the distributional problem
that undermines their ability to pursue coordination despite the gains coordination is
expected to produce. Thus, international antitrust cooperation resembles a coordination
game with distributional consequences (“CG”) rather than a PD.124
The distributional conflict between developed countries and developing countries
similarly stems from the disagreement over the content of the contemplated international
antitrust agreement. While developed countries call for a reduction of transaction costs
and enhanced market access, developing countries are concerned about their inability to
control the anti-competitive practices of MNCs and the need to shield their local
corporations from international competition.125 Thus, the coordination game between
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developed countries and developing countries could be formalized similarly to the game
between the United States and the EU, likewise resulting in two possible equilibria.
Unlike in a PD situation, where a state can obtain a higher individual payoff by
deviating from agreed commitments, an agreement that has been attained in a CG setting
is largely self-enforcing, since neither party has an incentive to renege on its
commitments. Once the agreement is reached, sustaining cooperation in a CG is easier
than in a PD due to the absence of incentives to cheat. The low likelihood of
opportunistic behavior also renders any formal enforcement mechanism less useful.
Assuming that international antitrust cooperation indeed predominantly resembles a CG
rather than a PD, the WTO’s DSM is expected to be of limited relevance for antitrust
negotiations. Thus, it is not surprising that states let the WTO antitrust negotiations fail
and focused their efforts to pursue non-binding antitrust cooperation outside of the WTO
framework instead.
Two caveats are in order. First, while deliberate cheating is likely rare, developing
countries’ capacity constraints, including a lack of enforcement institutions and antitrust
expertise, might lead to an occasional unintentional defection from international antitrust
commitments. However, to the extent that states’ defection can be traced to capacity
constraints rather than to intentional violation of the agreement, a binding agreement with
enforcement provisions would be unlikely to bring greater compliance. Capacity building
in the form of technical assistance is likely to yield better results vis-à-vis developing
countries whose inadequate regulatory capacities renders compliance with the
contemplated agreement difficult. 126 Second, occasional intentional defection can occur
in CG if a state wants to shift the point of coordination to its preferred equilibrium.127
However, this type of defection from the established equilibrium can be distinguished
from cheating in a PD situation for the defecting state in a CG setting would need to
make the defection public in order to force other states move to the new equilibrium.
Accordingly, in the case of antitrust cooperation, the primary concern was and
remains how to overcome the distributional conflict in the first place, not how to deter
defection and sustain the focal point of coordination once states have settled on one. This
provided states with a rationale for steering away from the WTO and its DSM. When
opportunistic behavior is expected to be limited, states consider non-binding agreements
adequate, especially since such agreements are often faster and cheaper to negotiate.
3. Concluding Remarks on the Enforcement Explanation
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The negotiation history of the TRIPs Agreement illustrates the intrinsic value that
the WTO can add to the process of negotiating international agreements. The primary
advantage of negotiating an agreement under the auspices of the WTO lies in the
institution’s ability to solve a PD. Absent the ability to exchange credible and enforceable
commitments, states would pursue sub-optimal policies in a PD setting. Thus, negotiating
the TRIPs Agreement within the WTO gave states the necessary guarantees on other
states’ future behavior, leading all states to abandon their dominant, non-cooperative
strategies and move toward an equilibrium that maximized social welfare. In contrast, the
WTO does not add similar value to the pursuit of antitrust convergence in a CG setting
where states always have the incentive to pursue a strategy that maximizes social welfare.
Either focal point in the CG constitutes a Pareto-optimal outcome. While the WTO might
help states choose between the two focal points, the greatest institutional advantage of the
WTO—its ability to enforce compliance—is not called for by the strategic structure of
the CG.
E.

Cost-Benefit Explanation: Are the Net Benefits of Cooperation and the
Opportunity Costs of Non-Cooperation High?

As shown above, the benefits of a TRIPs Agreement were perceived as extremely
high for the developed countries that were unambiguous beneficiaries of the Agreement.
Similarly, the discussion below reveals that the opportunity costs of not cooperating in
the intellectual property domain in the WTO were much higher than the costs of
maintaining a decentralized antitrust regime. Thus, the difference in the net benefits of
WTO cooperation and the opportunity costs of forgoing WTO negotiations further
explains the successful conclusion of the TRIPs Agreement and the failure to reach a
WTO antitrust agreement.
1. The High Benefits of the TRIPs Agreement and the Absence of Alternatives
In the case of TRIPs negotiations, stakes were high and alternatives few. It is
virtually impossible for states to rely on their domestic IP laws to curtail abuses of IPRs
that take place abroad. Multilateral solutions were therefore indispensable. At the same
time, existing multilateral venues prior to the TRIPs had proved inadequate. Indeed, it
was their dissatisfaction with WIPO that led powerful states and their domestic interest
groups to demand for an alternative regime. Most importantly, the WIPO lacked the tools
for effective enforcement, which increased the relative attractiveness of negotiating the
TRIPs Agreement in the WTO.
At times, international institutions are not necessary for achieving greater
convergence. Some areas of cooperation are conducive to “market-based harmonization”
whereby states’ regulatory regimes converge even if there is no international agreement
that calls for such convergence. Beth Simmons has demonstrated how the interplay
between two variables—the extent of negative externalities and the countries’ incentives
to emulate—determine whether formal legal institutions are necessary for achieving
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convergence.128 Her model assumes that there is a “dominant center,” which is often a
great power that is a primary regulator in the field. In the case of IP regulation, the
dominant center consists of the United States and the EU. If the decentralized regulatory
framework creates negative externalities, the United States and the EU are expected to
want the other countries to converge to the regulatory model they embrace. If the United
States and the EU seek harmonization, they have the choice of pursuing cooperation
within an international institution such as the WTO or waiting for other countries to
adjust to the U.S.-EU domestic regulatory framework with little, if any, institutionalized
pressure. A chosen strategy hinges on the other countries’ incentives to emulate their
regulation; with a high incentive to emulate, institutions are not necessary whereas with a
low incentive to emulate, institutions are central in bringing about the desired
convergence.
In the case of TRIPs, the extent of negative externalities stemming from
developing countries’ inadequate IP protection was extremely high. At the same time,
developing countries had very low incentives to emulate the United States and the EU,
given that high IP protection would impose costs and offer no benefits to them. Efforts to
achieve IP converge therefore forms a prime example of regulatory convergence that is
driven though institutions; here through centralized pressure at the WTO.
2. The Low Net Benefits of the WTO Antitrust Agreement and the Existence of
Alternatives
States had a much higher tolerance for the status quo in the case of antitrust than
they did in the case of IP cooperation. I have elsewhere argued that one of the reasons
antitrust negotiations have failed in the WTO is that the agreement was perceived to
generate low net benefits.129 Compared to the TRIPs Agreement, which was considered a
high-stakes agreement for its proponents, the enthusiasm for the antitrust agreement was
tempered by the agreement’s low (and in any event more uncertain) expected benefits
relative to the costs of negotiating the agreement in the WTO.
A WTO agreement is more likely if it provides states with large net benefits at a
relatively low cost. The reason states may have concluded that the pursuit of international
antitrust cooperation in the WTO would not render high net benefits comes from three
factors. First, the extent of aggregate benefits available from cooperation is uncertain and
possibly not as great as generally presumed. Second, adjustment costs under a binding
international agreement are likely to be high, in particular when compared to the
uncertain benefits stemming from cooperation. Third, the opportunity costs of noncooperation are relatively low, particularly for the key states with strong, existing
domestic antitrust laws.
With respect to the aggregate benefits from cooperation, many commentators
advocating binding international antitrust rules presume that such rules would lead to
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significant transaction-cost savings. These presumptions are intuitively appealing but
have not been demonstrated empirically.130 While it is difficult, if not impossible, to
quantify the inefficiencies embedded in the current regime, some recent research suggests
that at least some costs in this regard might have been exaggerated. For example, a recent
survey of international mergers calls into question the commonly held view that the
multi-jurisdictional merger review would lead to significant transaction costs.131 Another
study suggests that anti-competitive practices may not constitute significant strategic nontariff barriers as commonly believed.132 And while few high profile cases, including the
prohibited acquisition involving GE and Honeywell133 or the contested merger between
Boeing and McDonnell-Douglas,134 have heightened fears of inconsistent decisions by
different antitrust authorities, enforcement conflicts appear rare in practice.135 Finally, the
benefits of the WTO antitrust agreement are further diminished if national bias in
domestic antitrust enforcement is likely to be less prevalent than often presumed, as
claimed above in Part D.136
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Negotiating and implementing a binding WTO antitrust agreement would also be
costly, reducing the net benefits from its success. Contracting costs involved in the
pursuit of a binding agreement under the auspices of the WTO would be significant due
to numerous parties, multiple negotiation rounds and extensive multi-issue bargaining.137
In addition, compliance costs associated with implementing and enforcing international
antitrust rules would be high, in particular for developing countries that lack the
institutional capacity, technical expertise, and financial resources to establish
sophisticated antitrust regimes. Similar costs were also present in the TRIPs negotiations.
However, in the case of TRIPs, the high costs were more than offset by yet much higher
benefits for the key parties to the negotiations.
Despite the high costs of negotiating a WTO antitrust agreement, one might argue
that the costs of pursuing cooperation outside of the WTO could be even higher. Nonbinding antitrust cooperation today consists of a myriad of different bilateral, plurilateral,
and multilateral governance instruments, all typically focusing only on some subset of
substantive or procedural antitrust matters. While various non-binding agreements may
involve relatively low contracting costs individually, the number of different non-binding
agreements that would be required to cover the range of issues and parties that a potential
WTO agreement could embrace would be high. These multiple non-binding instruments
among different parties, taken together, could be costlier than a single binding
international antitrust agreement, assuming such an agreement was feasible to negotiate.
At the same time, while the ex post costs of a single, all-embracing, and successfully
concluded WTO grand bargain could be lower than a myriad of separate single-issue
agreements, states’ ex ante risk-adjusted perception of the costs of a multi-issue
negotiations is significantly higher. This is true in particular given the greater likelihood
of failure in such negotiations and costs involved in the collapse of a large scale
negotiation agenda.
Finally, the opportunity costs in the absence of a WTO antitrust agreement are
distinctly low due to the variety of other solutions available for states. States with
existing, well-functioning antitrust regimes are often able to exercise jurisdiction vis-àvis foreign corporations as long as the allegedly anti-competitive conduct of the
corporations has an effect on their domestic market.138 Both the United States and the EU
have resorted to extraterritorial enforcement on several occasions.139 This ability to
engage in extraterritorial enforcement makes the case for an international agreement less
compelling. States can also solve many of the collective action problems through
bilateral cooperation agreements and existing informal cooperation mechanisms. These
alternative forms of antitrust cooperation have enhanced international cooperation,
aligned domestic antitrust laws, and contributed to a significant proliferation of antitrust
137
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regimes around the world. At the same time, these alternative regimes have further
reduced the need for a binding international antitrust regime.
Thus, antitrust cooperation is an issue area that is conducive to market-based
harmonization. The extent of negative externalities generated by decentralized antitrust
regimes is uncertain and in any event likely to be lower than they were in the case of the
decentralized IP regime. In addition, developing counties and emerging markets have an
incentive to emulate more established antitrust regimes. They have actively sought to
copy developed country antitrust laws in order to strengthen the operation of their
domestic markets and to curtail anti-competitive conduct of multinational corporations
that conduct business in their markets. In some areas of antitrust, where there seem to be
more obvious negative externalities, states complement market-based harmonization with
“softer” institutional assistance such as developing non-binding guidelines and best
practices within institutions like the ICN. In either case, antitrust cooperation does not
seem to call for strong, centralized cooperation in the WTO.
Consequently, while a binding international antitrust agreement would be
expected to create benefits in the form of transactional efficiencies, the high costs of
WTO cooperation together with limited expected gains and the availability of alternatives
explain why states have chosen to pursue other regulatory priorities in the WTO, and
preferred other paths when seeking international antitrust convergence.
CONCLUSION
This Article has sought to explain when an international legal framework like the
WTO can facilitate international cooperation. Through an empirical enquiry into IP and
antitrust cooperation, it has endeavored to provide a more nuanced understanding on the
limits of the WTO’s expansionism to new areas of regulatory cooperation.
By contrasting the successfully concluded TRIPs Agreement with the failed
antitrust negotiations, this Article has challenged the prevailing view that the TRIPs
Agreement offers an instructive precedent for antitrust negotiations in the WTO. A closer
examination of the strategic situation underlying the TRIPs and the antitrust negotiations
reveals that the two areas of cooperation have little in common.
The strategic situations characterizing international antitrust and IP cooperation
differ in several ways. First, the general preconditions that underlie all successful efforts
to cooperate internationally were met in the case of the TRIPs negotiations, but not in the
case of antitrust negotiations. While the great powers unanimously supported the TRIPs
Agreement, comparable consensus was missing in the case of antitrust. Similarly,
influential interest groups within the great powers supported the TRIPs Agreement, but
showed little enthusiasm for the antitrust agreement. In the absence of political rents that
could be captured by major trading powers, the likelihood of reaching an antitrust
agreement was dim.
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In addition, the WTO’s institutional advantages were directly relevant for the
TRIPs Agreement, but did little to solve the problems underlying international antitrust
cooperation. In particular, the unequal distributional consequences of the TRIPs
Agreement were solvable through issue linkages. However, similar linkages could not
solve the antitrust negotiations, since there was ex ante uncertainty regarding the winners
and losers under the prospective antitrust agreement. In addition, the risk of opportunism
and the consequent need for an enforcement mechanism was prevalent in the case of
TRIPs, but trivial in the case of antitrust. This rendered the WTO’s dispute settlement
mechanism germane for the TRIPs negotiations but only marginally useful for the
antitrust negotiations. Finally, in the case of TRIPs, both the net benefits of cooperation
and the opportunity costs of non-cooperation within the WTO were high because there
were few alternative regulatory regimes, while the opposite was true for the antitrust
agreement. Taken together, these reasons contributed to the successful conclusion of the
TRIPs Agreement and the failure of antitrust negotiations in the WTO.
The inquiry into the differences between IP and antitrust cooperation also calls
into question the conventional wisdom that the TRIPs Agreement provides a useful
template for WTO negotiations in other areas of regulatory cooperation. The dynamics
underlying antitrust cooperation have been presumed to be most similar to those
underlying IP cooperation, making antitrust the most obvious next issue that the WTO
can incorporate within its framework. Yet, despite the similarity of antitrust to trade,
efforts to coordinate antitrust policy through the WTO have failed. This suggests that a
careful inquiry into the strategic situation characterizing the regulation of corruption,
investment, labor or environment would be required before one can assume that other
issues can be incorporated into the WTO following the example set by the TRIPs
Agreement. Rather than providing a template for future negotiations, the TRIPs
Agreement may be more appropriately viewed as a product of an idiosyncratic set of
conditions which are unlikely to be replicated in other areas of cooperation.
Disaggregating the conditions that make cooperation in the WTO feasible is also
helpful when looking at the future prospects of cooperation in the WTO. States’ ability to
cooperate within the WTO is likely to become increasingly difficult in the future,
suggesting that the failed antitrust negotiations may be more predictive than the TRIPs
negotiations on the future boundaries of the WTO. The political-economy landscape
underlying WTO negotiations is growing into an increasingly complex one, undermining
the conditions which made WTO agreements feasible in the past. This applies across the
key variables to WTO’s success identified above.
For instance, great power consensus is becoming increasingly difficult to establish
and sustain today. The formerly tight U.S.-EU alliance has gradually weakened following
the end of the Cold War.140 This has had an impact on all areas of cooperation, including
trade.141 The United States and EU’s capacity to exercise leadership has also declined due
to a growing domestic resistance to the WTO’s agenda in both countries. Consequently,
the United States and EU’s increasingly limited abilities to secure domestic ratification
140
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for WTO agreements have forced them to retract from their active roles as drivers of
WTO cooperation.142
Achieving consensus among the great powers has also become more complicated
as China and other emerging economies have begun to challenge the United States and
the EU’s economic dominance. A U.S.-EU accord is likely to remain a necessary, but
possibly not sufficient, precondition for a WTO agreement. Instead, a consensus must be
sought among a greater number of increasingly heterogeneous states as the emerging
trade powers weigh in more forcefully when setting the negotiation agenda and when
bargaining over the terms of the specific agreements. China and India, for instance, have
already been able to block progress in WTO negotiations where proposed agreements fail
to incorporate their interests and priorities. At the same time, they have shown little
willingness to step in and assume genuine leadership role in moving the WTO
negotiations forward.143
Future negotiations within the WTO may face an additional challenge if powerful
interest groups benefiting from trade liberalization shift their lobbying activity to other
venues. Given the recent difficulties in moving forward with the Doha Round of trade
talks, pressure groups might increasingly perceive that the WTO is no longer apt to open
global markets. Instead, they may urge their governments to negotiate bilateral and
regional agreements, which are faster, more certain, and more manageable to negotiate.
In the past seven years while the Doha negotiations have been hobbling along fruitlessly,
bilateral and regional trade agreements have continued to proliferate.144 These
agreements have further lowered the opportunity costs of non-WTO agreements,
reinforcing the shift from global trade deals to regional and bilateral ones.
Another reason for United States and EU multinationals’ vanishing support for
the WTO process is that these companies have already managed to reap the most
important benefits of trade liberalization. The past success of the WTO has delivered
essentially all the market opening they need.145 These stakeholders used to be the most
vocal supporters of the WTO’s agenda. Today, the loudest domestic voices are exercised
by consumers and interest groups critical of the recent inroads the WTO has made in
intervening with domestic regulatory policies such as IP protection and health
measures.146
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Issue linkages are also likely to become more difficult and risky in the subsequent
WTO rounds. The “single undertaking” approach to WTO negotiations with multiple
issue linkages has been a creative and at times an effective way of bringing controversial
issues within the WTO. Insistence of package deals has ensured that states have signed
on to agreements that fail to deliver direct benefits for them as long as they have been
compensated in another area. However, the possibility of compromises unraveling
increases with the number of players and the complexity of negotiation agendas. Thus, as
compromises are sought among an even-greater number of increasingly heterogeneous
players, the single undertaking approach is becoming questionable at best.
The best argument for the continuing relevance of the WTO stems from its
internationally unique ability to enforce legally binding commitments. Opportunistic
behavior continues to characterize many areas of cooperation, and it is unlikely that
protectionist tendencies will ever altogether vanish. However, a compelling argument can
be made that cooperation dilemmas underlying international trade issues rarely resemble
a PD today. For instance, it is no longer unambiguous whether imposing antidumping
duties on Chinese products only hurts the Chinese and improves the United States’ terms
of trade. Such duties also hurt the U.S. companies in China that export their products
back to the United States. Similarly, given the rapid increase in trade in intermediate
goods,147 duties on Chinese inputs also hurt the U.S. companies that buy and incorporate
those Chinese inputs into their final products. Thus, the “unbundling” of the production
chain has changed many states’ and interest groups’ perception that opportunistic
behavior and protectionism serves their interests.148 It has also paved the way for
unilateral trade liberalization, challenging the conventional assumption that international
trade is always impeded by protectionist impulses and that such impulses need to be
curtailed through hard law and threats of sanctions.
Finally, while some attempts to conclude the Doha Round have failed because
there were too many controversial issues, more recent rounds have failed partly because
of the lack of inclusion of issues with satisfactory net gains for all parties. The Doha
negotiation agenda is now stripped of much of its initial ambition since states have
narrowed the agenda to save the failing round. Thus, where the net benefits available
from a WTO round are perceived as inadequate, states are likely to abandon the WTO
and pursue more substantial commitments with a smaller group of like-minded trading
partners.
Where does this leave the prospect of cooperation within the WTO, going
forward? One scenario on the future limits of the WTO is that governments have already
picked the low-hanging fruit and thereby satisfied the most salient needs of their
powerful interest groups, leaving a dwindling pool of uncertain and contested benefits for
states to negotiate. These remaining benefits are also more difficult to agree upon among
147
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distinctly heterogonous trade powers. This would marginalize the WTO’s role with
respect to future liberalization commitments and leave the institution in the role of
adjudicating disputes stemming from existing agreements.149 This scenario suggests that
the WTO may well have met its limits and that we are unlikely to see new agreements
incorporated within its framework.
Another scenario is that the gains available through bilateral and regional trade
agreements do not make the WTO obsolete. Under this scenario, it is assumed that
protectionism resurges and continues to span across global markets. New trade barriers
are erected. Eliminating them creates losers and causes resistance, which can only be
overcome through transfer payments that the WTO can facilitate. Opportunistic behavior
continues to characterize many areas of cooperation. In these areas, the WTO is likely to
remain as a useful forum in which to negotiate enforceable commitments among many
states. In this respect, states have few alternatives to the WTO. This view predicts that the
WTO will remain the central pillar of the world trade system and continue to attract the
negotiation of new issues under its umbrella. However, if states continue to seek trade
liberalization through the WTO, they need to carefully weigh the costs and the benefits of
its current decision-making structures, including its insistence on the single undertaking
and its requirement that all states need to sign onto all agreements.
Under either scenario, the WTO’s recent inability in furthering its liberalization
agenda highlights the need for a more focused debate on the institution’s capabilities,
goals and priorities. The future prospects for cooperation within the WTO continue to
hinge on the WTO’s perceived relevance in maintaining and strengthening free trade. At
best, the above discussion not only helps shed light to the WTO’s ability to foster
international agreements thus far, but it may also provide a starting point for a discussion
on whether and how the institution might serve states’ future needs in an increasingly
complex economic and political landscape.
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